Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy by Sorell, Tom
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Sorell, Tom. (2017) Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy. British Journal 
for the History of Philosophy. 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88467          
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal 
for the History of Philosophy. on 18/05/2017 available online: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1320971   
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
 1 
Experimental Philosophy and History of Philosophy1 
Tom Sorell 
 
Is experimental philosophy a kind of philosophy? Since it involves techniques that 
experimental philosophers themselves admit are not typical of current academic 
philosophy, and since some of these techniques are borrowed from psychology and 
other social sciences, it is at least arguable that, despite calling itself ‘philosophy’, 
experimental philosophy is better classified as psychology or some other social 
science. Some experimental philosophers think that they can resist this conclusion 
with an argument from the history of philosophy. They claim that certain historical 
figures who no-one would deny are philosophers pursued empirical enquiry, and 
that experimental philosophy stands in the same tradition. According to them, If 
contemporary academic philosophy is in tension with experimental philosophy, that 
is because contemporary academic philosophy has lost touch with its roots, not 
because experimental philosophy is actually psychology or some other social science 
in disguise.  
 
I claim that this sort of argument from the history of philosophy is weak. I first 
suggest that different versions of this argument are question-begging or open to 
counter-example. More precisely, there is the following dilemma. Either the 
argument from the history of philosophy sets the threshold too low for counting as 
philosophy in the modern sense of the term, so that Renaissance physics or 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to Alberto Vanzo for valuable comments on an earlier draft. Work on this chapter was 
supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council Xphi project, grant AH/L014998/1. 
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psychology counts as philosophy; or else it sets the threshold for counting as 
experimental philosophy too low, counting a willingness merely to make use of 
empirical results sufficient, rather than an attachment to special sorts of 
psychological evidence – nearly always based on surveys that elicit intuitions. 2  A 
willingness to use empirical results certainly connects early modern and earlier 
philosophy with some sorts of philosophy being done today –with a broadly 
naturalizing sort of philosophy—but the status of broadly naturalizing philosophy as 
philosophy is hardly ever questioned, whereas the status of experimental philosophy 
as philosophy is regularly doubted or disputed.  
 
It is the methodological distinctiveness of experimental philosophy  —its 
characteristic adherence to survey techniques—that both obstructs its claim to 
count as philosophy and its claim to reach back to Renaissance physics and earlier 
forms of empirical enquiry that were once called philosophy .  Or so I argue in the 
second section by reference to the cases of Descartes and Hobbes  Toward the end 
of the paper I address the claim –due to Anstey and Vanzo-- that current 
experimental philosophy has something in common not with most past forms of 
Western philosophy, or even all early modern philosophy,  but with a movement in 
the 17th century associated especially with Boyle that was labeled “experimental 
philosophy”. I treat even this more careful claim with some scepticism. 
 
I 
 
                                                        
2 At times, but not often, experimental philosophy uses evidence other than survey evidence—eye-
movement tracking results, for example.  
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The versions of the argument from the history of philosophy that I am going to 
consider come from three sources: the Introduction to the 2007 edition by Joshua 
Knobe and Shaun Nichols (2007) of Experimental Philosophy, a paper by Joshua Kobe 
(2007) , and a new textbook by Justin Sytsma and Jonathan Livengood (2016). 
 
The Knobe and Nichols Introduction is called ‘An experimental philosophy 
manifesto’, and it opens as follows: 
It used to be a commonplace that the discipline of philosophy was deeply 
concerned with questions about the human condition. Philosophers thought 
about human beings and how their minds worked. They took an interest in 
reason and passion, culture and innate ideas, the origins of people’s moral 
and religious beliefs. On this traditional conception, it wasn’t particularly 
important to keep philosophy clearly distinct from psychology, history, or 
political science. Philosophers were concerned, in a very general way, with 
questions about how everything fit together. 
 
The new movement of experimental philosophy seeks a return to this 
traditional vision. Like philosophers of centuries past, we are concerned with 
questions about how human beings actually happen to be. We recognize that 
such an inquiry will involve us in the study of phenomena that are messy, 
contingent, and highly variable across times and places, but we do not see 
how that fact is supposed to make the inquiry any less genuinely 
philosophical. On the contrary, we think that many of the deepest questions 
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of philosophy can only be properly addressed by immersing oneself in the 
messy, contingent, highly variable truths about how human beings really are. 
 
But there is also an important respect in which experimental philosophers 
depart from this earlier tradition. Unlike the philosophers of centuries past, 
we think that a critical method for figuring out how human beings think is to 
go out and actually run systematic empirical studies. Hence, experimental 
philosophers proceed by conducting experimental investigations of the 
psychological processes underlying people’s intuitions about central 
philosophical issues. (Knobe and Nichols 2007, 3) 
 
This is a particularly schematic version of the argument from the history of 
philosophy. No philosophers from the past are mentioned by name, and no specific 
temporal frame of reference is given.  
 
The background for the argument is the prevalence today, or at least in 2007, of a 
certain mainstream conception of philosophy, according to which philosophy is 
conceptual analysis, where analyses are statements of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of concepts like knowledge, perception, causation, and 
intentional action. Proposed analyses are sometimes tested by means of counter-
examples intended to show that proposed necessary and sufficient conditions can 
hold without someone’s knowing something, without someone’s perceiving 
something or without an agent’s acting intentionally. Counter-examples are 
supposed to engage with intuitions –unreflective judgements made by competent 
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users of the concepts under analysis. These competent users are often professional 
philosophers or their students speaking for all other users of the concepts.  
 
Experimental philosophers characteristically test philosophers’ claims by sampling 
the intuitions  of competent users of concepts who are not philosophers. By 
administering questionnaires to lay people, experimental philosophers try to find out 
whether lay people attribute knowledge or credit people with intentional action in 
cases where analytic philosophers would.   Compiling survey evidence  is what makes 
experimental philosophy  methodologically distinctive and also what makes it seem 
to some in the profession to be  a non-philosophical practice. Experimental 
philosophers often claim to find on the basis of their surveys that lay users of 
concepts do not agree with professional philosophers, that their cultural 
backgrounds influence the way that they distinguish between e.g. knowledge and 
non-knowledge, and that different orderings of examples produce different verdicts 
among philosophers and non-philosophers.  
 
This survey approach to analysis is typical of a lot of experimental philosophy, but 
Knobe parts company with these philosophers by being hostile to conceptual 
analysis itself (Knobe 2007), even when pursued with systematic surveys of the 
intuitions of non-philosophers. For him people’s intuitive reactions to different 
examples are not of interest because they form an evidence base for proposals of 
necessary and sufficient conditions; instead they are a basis for inference to 
mechanisms that underlie beliefs abut different subject-matters For example, on the 
basis of survey evidence of lay reactions to different kinds of thought experiments 
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about deterministic and non-deterministic worlds, Knobe claims that people’s moral 
beliefs underlie attributions of responsibility in unexpected ways (Nichols and Knobe 
2007). What ties together Knobe’s surveys with those of people who simply work in 
a more empirical way on conceptual analysis is a repudiation of pronouncements on 
intuitions from the armchair.  And precisely this stance brings experimental 
philosophers into conflict with those who think that  philosophy is conceptual 
analysis, that conceptual analysis is properly conducted without surveys (Sosa 2006; 
Kauppinen, 2007), and that evidence of departures  in the wider population from 
philosophical intuitions is disputable (Sosa 2006).  
 
Which brings us to Knobe’s claiming to stand in a tradition in relation to which 
linguistic philosophy in general and conceptual analysis in particular are aberrations. 
To go back to the passage, philosophy is rightly said to be concerned with the human 
mind, and the philosophy of the past is rightly said to be concerned with the causes 
of beliefs. But it seems to be assumed that disciplinary boundaries within philosophy 
used to exist, and that philosophers in the past were less reluctant to cross them 
than philosophers today. This begs the question of whether experimental philosophy 
lies outside what is now called philosophy, since ‘philosophy’ used to mean, but no 
longer means, something like ‘systematic, methodical enquiry into causes’ and 
would have included the mind as its subject matter. The question begged is whether, 
if ‘philosophy’ now means something narrower than ‘philosophy’ used to mean, that 
is because of an unphilosophical  intellectual narrowness on the part of current 
practitioners –a narrowness out of keeping with the long view of what doing 
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philosophy amounts to– or a genuine shift in what experts in the field now mostly 
agree is its subject matter, e.g. away from any concern with causes.   
  
In ‘Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Significance’, Knobe (2007) claims that 
the methods of experimental philosophers are more relevant than those of the 
analytic tradition to studying the mechanisms underlying various theoretical and 
practical capacities of human beings. What is more, still according to him, the 
attempt to understand these mechanisms is more characteristic of the long-term 
history of philosophy, and thus might have a stronger claim to be authentic 
philosophical research, than work in the analytic tradition. Knobe concedes that 
experimental philosophy may not have lasting relevance for the “analytic project,” 
except as a negative programme intended to deflate some of the claims that analytic 
philosophers have based on intuition, but he suggests that questions about human 
nature and cognition and more generally the mechanisms underlying intentionality, 
cognition and morality have been of interest in Western philosophy since Plato and 
Aristotle, and that philosophers as different from one another as Nietzsche and 
Hume have carried on this tradition. 
 
Here is Knobe sketching the relevant line of thought: 
 
[Experimental philosophers] focus on questions about the internal 
psychological processes underlying people’s intuitions. That is to say, they 
are not primarily about the external properties and relations that people’s 
concepts pick out but rather about the internal processes that lead people to 
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have the intuitions that they do. By studying these processes, experimental 
philosophers take themselves to be getting at certain fundamental issues 
about the way people ordinarily understand their world… Perhaps the claim 
[from analytic philosophers] is that research on the most fundamental 
concepts people use to understand themselves and their world doesn’t 
really count as “philosophy.” But this claim seems a bit hopeless and bizarre. 
It is not as though experimental philosophers are involved in some sort of 
radical departure from the traditional problems of philosophy. In fact the 
chronology is just the opposite. For most of the history of philosophy, 
questions about human nature and the nature of cognition were absolutely 
central. Then, for a comparatively brief period, many philosophers forsook 
these problems in favor of problems that had a more technical character. 
Experimental philosophy now seeks a return to the traditional problems of 
philosophy, the problems that played such a prominent role in the work of 
Plato, Aristotle and so many of their successors. (Knobe 2007, 89-91) 
 
This argument from the history of philosophy is questionable on at least two 
grounds. First, and most obviously, it equivocates on the word ‘philosophy.’ It is true 
that ‘philosophy’ used to mean science in general, and included a whole range of 
systematic empirical enquiries, such as biology, physics, medicine, the study of the 
mind, morals, politics and many other things. If Knobe’s complaint were that 
philosophy more narrowly conceived has only recently broken away from the main 
body of science, and that there is a still a place for the empirical study of human 
nature and the nature of cognition, it would be uncontroversial, indeed 
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incontrovertible. But what is at issue is not whether there is room for such empirical 
study, but whether there is room for it now as a branch of philosophy:  as I have 
already claimed, it begs the question to argue from a description of the history of 
philosophy in which ‘philosophy’ mostly means systematic enquiry into causes. That 
description begs the question because the meaning of the term ‘philosophy’ has 
changed. On the other hand, If Knobe were merely arguing that “experimental 
philosophy” in his sense is intellectually respectable whether it is philosophy or not, 
no question would be begged, and I for one would be far less inclined to take issue.  
 
The second ground for questioning Knobe’s argument from the history of philosophy 
is that, while it improves on ‘Manifesto’ by mentioning names, it is very poor history 
of philosophy. First, it homogenizes into one tradition the work of pre-analytic 
philosophers operating over millennia in very different places. Second, and more 
specifically, it posits a kind of smooth progress for this body of work up to the point 
at which, as Knobe thinks, a regrettable and decisive intellectual detour occurred – 
with the development of early analytic philosophy. Neither the homogenizing 
interpretation nor the claim that the birth of the analytic tradition is a crucial 
aberration is very credible. To take the homogenizing interpretation first, it seems to 
imply that before the start of the analytic project there was a kind of continuity in 
philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche. This reckons without the radical reinterpretation 
of Aristotelian methods of philosophy that started around the time of Descartes and 
continued through Hume. It also reckons without the difference made to the post-
Humean understanding of nature by Kant, and through Kant, to the understanding of 
nature in Nietzsche. Though it may be true that there is a sustained interest from 
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Plato to Hume to Nietzsche in empirical questions, the existence of that very low 
common denominator does not mean that there is a uniform, or even a relatively 
unitary, understanding of the empirical from ancient to pre-analytic philosophy. On 
the contrary, there is reason to think that Aristotle was much more geared to 
preserving pre-philosophical opinion or ‘appearances’ in natural philosophy than 
either Plato before him or the post-Cartesians. Indeed, the concept of ‘scientia,’ 
which on the surface appears to be shared by ancients and moderns, is in fact 
radically reinterpreted, starting with Descartes (Sorell, Rogers and Krave 2012). As 
for the supposed status of the analytic tradition as anti-empirical turning point in 
philosophy, this fails to take into account Descartes’s insistence on a first philosophy 
that is prior to and conceptually independent of the concepts (extension and 
motion) required for physics. It also reckons without Kant’s non-empirically realized 
conceptual apparatus for natural science. 
 Knobe’s argument from the history of philosophy not only suggests that 
authentic philosophy is science, but that current physiology, chemistry, or 
theoretical physics is in fact philosophy, because each has emerged from the study 
of underlying human and non-human mechanisms that people called “philosophers” 
used to engage in. On the same grounds as Knobe argues in effect for suppression of 
the science/philosophy distinction, one could argue for the suppression of the 
philosophy/physiology distinction and the philosophy/physics distinction: both 
physiology and physics grew out of a much more ‘interdisciplinary’ kind of science 
than we have today, the same science that is hard, according to Knobe, to 
disentangle from philosophy. So psychology and physics could just as well be called 
philosophy, and indeed might have more of a claim to count as philosophy than the 
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analytic tradition. Certainly this looks like a conclusion Knobe is committed to. But 
there is no wishing or stipulating away the conceptual change that has made 
‘physiology,’ ‘physics’ and ‘philosophy’ all mean different things. And although its 
motivation is no different from that for saying that ‘philosophy’ really means a broad 
kind of science, the claim that ‘physics’ really means ‘philosophy’ seems neither 
plausible nor interesting. 
 
Systma and Livengood improve on Knobe and Nichols. In their introduction they take 
the case of Descartes. In some of his work, they say, he was the armchair 
philosopher par excellence, and so the nemesis of some contemporary experimental 
philosophers. On the other hand,  
even Descartes did not philosophize exclusively from the armchair. In fact, he 
did a good deal of empirical work, and such work is, in our opinion, as much a 
part of Descartes’s philosophical legacy as are his meditations. For example, 
in the Optics he offers an account of visual perception, calling on a number of 
empirical observations in doing so… [In the Optics] Descartes discusses an 
empirical investigation that he conducted –he went out and carefully 
dissected the eye of an ox to learn something about how the eye functions. 
Further, this investigation, amongst others, played an important role in 
Descartes’s account of visual perception, and he took himself to be doing 
philosophy in putting his account forward. 
  
Experimental philosophy is part of a log tradition. While much of Western 
philosophy has been done from the metaphorical armchair, much of it has 
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also been done in the field or in the laboratory. Consequently, we do not 
think of the contemporary incarnation of experimental philosophy –the new 
experimental philosophy as we will call it– as either breaking with or being 
contemptuous of traditional philosophy. (Sytsma and Livengood 2016, xxviii-
xxix) 
 
This passage, too, is question-begging. The fact that Descartes saw his work in optics 
as philosophy does not establish that philosophy in his sense is the same as 
philosophy in the sense of most current practitioners of the subject. On the contrary, 
as has already been pointed out repeatedly, ‘philosophy’ used to mean ‘science’. 
Again, although philosophers working today undoubtedly count Descartes as a 
philosopher in their sense, it does not follow that what makes Descartes a 
philosopher in the modern sense is his theory of visual perception in general or his 
experiment on the eye of the ox in particular: for all the passage shows, the 
continuity might be due entirely or overwhelmingly to the place of the Meditations 
in the canon.  As is well known, the Meditations starts out by calling into question 
whole classes of empirical beliefs, including those from pre-modern sciences, and 
only proceeds later to vindicating a criterion of truth for very restricted classes of 
empirical beliefs. Its methods and results are thus very different from those of the 
Optics or his suppressed physics. What is more, they are out of keeping with 
experimental philosophy, since  Descartes  simply assumes that what he finds 
undeniable and perfectly certain –that God exists and is no deceiver, that matter is 
extended --all his readers will find impossible to doubt as well.  
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Systma and Livengood use the methods of experimental philosophy to fix a meaning 
for “experimental philosophy”. This involves a survey of philosophy teachers and 
graduate students from a range of philosophy departments in the English-speaking 
world, the respondents being divided into those who self-identified either as 
experimental philosophers or non-experimental philosophers. A questionnaire was 
administered, which got a 15 per cent response rate involving 370 respondents. This 
showed that philosophers in general, and self-identifying experimental philosophers 
in particular, were disinclined to tie experimental philosophy to a distinctive subject-
matter it is often tied to: the folk-intuitions elicited to test theses about the 
meanings of philosophically important vocabulary such as ‘knows’, ‘causes’, ‘refers 
to’, ‘is permissible’, and ‘is obligatory’. On the basis of this disinclination, Sytsma and 
Livengood conclude that  
It is at least as reasonable for us to adopt a broad conception of experimental 
philosophy as a narrow conception for the purposes of this book. And that is 
what we will do: we will treat experimental philosophy as involving the 
systematic collection and analysis of empirical data to help answer 
philosophical questions or solve philosophical problems, whether or not the 
data directly concern intuitions (Sytsma and Livengood 2016, 18) 
From the angle of our concerns in this paper, the decision about whether to adopt a 
broad or narrow definition is important. If experimental philosophy were tied to 
linguistic intuitions, then there would be no prospect of bearing out Systma’s and 
Livengood’s claim that experimental philosophy belongs to a tradition also involving 
Descartes’s work in the Optics: on the other hand, the less restrictive the definition, 
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the more likely experimental philosophy can be said to have historical precedents, 
other things equal.  
 
There is still the question of what ‘philosophy’ means. If the meaning varies over 
time, as it plainly does, the continuity claim will once again be in danger of being 
undermined. To their credit, Systma and Livengood actually do devote a great deal of 
attention to what is reasonably understood by ‘philosophical question’ in their 
definition of experimental philosophy. They tie the philosophical to (a) the capacity 
to produce wonderment relative to a historical context; (b) the search for norms for 
human practices; (c) the necessary use of the apriori in reaching a philosophical 
answer; (d) making use of certain kinds of modal claims, and (e) applying a method 
for achieving conceptual clarity. On any of these understandings of the distinctively 
philosophical, they say, ‘there is an experimental turn’ (Sytsma and Livengood 2016, 
44). But the most they seem to me to show is that questions prompting an 
experiment (usually in the form of a survey of how people’s intuitions lie) are 
askable starting with any of (a) to (e), not that those questions, when asked even in 
the context of (a) to (e), are philosophical.3  
 
So we have two sources of worry about the Systma-Livengood definition of 
experimental philosophy. First, they may define it unduly widely. Their claim that 
‘experimental philosophy’ means more than surveys of intuitions is not univocally 
recommended by their survey evidence, and the survey evidence comes from 
                                                        
3 I do not have space to consider whether enquiries starting from (a) to (e)  all can be called 
‘philosophy’ without begging the question: one of the anonymous referees has convinced me there is 
unfinished business here. 
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relatively few philosophers. Crucially from the angle of this paper, the wide 
definition tends to prejudice the question of the existence of a tradition of 
experimental philosophy. Second, for all the survey evidence shows, the different 
approaches for distinguishing philosophical from non-philosophical questions at 
most permit experimental approaches: they do not require them. So the need to 
pursue philosophy by experimental methods is not convincingly established, and the 
conjecture that experiment is at most optional remains open. 
 
II 
 
In a recent paper (Sorell 2016), I have queried what I call the “do-it-yourself” 
approach of experimental philosophy. Why do philosophers have to survey the 
evidence for people having certain linguistic intuitions, for example. Or to take a 
different sort of experimental interest, why do philosophers have to find out if moral 
philosophers are better than others at returning or not stealing library books? 
(Schwitzgebel 2009) If investigations of linguistic intuitions could be done by 
sociolinguists, or if the borrowing habits of moral philosophers could be studied by 
sociologists, then philosophy could be influenced by sociology without itself being 
experimental. In that case there would be no strained disciplinary classifications and 
no need for tendentious history of philosophy. Philosophy that took account of the 
results would be open to the description of “empirically informed” philosophy, with 
the empirical work being carried out by non-philosophers. This approach is very 
common in the non-experimental philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychiatry 
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and even applied ethics, when philosophers collaborate with psychologists, 
psychiatrists and practitioners who face ethical challenges in a host of contexts.  
 
By contrast with experimental philosophy, what we might have here is something 
irreducibly interdisciplinary, classifiable either as philosophically-informed 
psychology or as psychologically-informed philosophy. Or we might have something 
immediately recognizable as philosophy, with accretions of other disciplines. 
Empirically informed philosophy of mind—philosophy of mind discussing some of the 
disorders written about by Oliver Sacks—or proposals about logical form informed 
by Chomskyan work on deep grammar, or work in ethics containing load-bearing 
elements taken from Darwin—these are already familiar specimens of mainstream 
philosophy, not philosophy requiring a manifesto.  
 
I draw attention to this kind of non-experimental but still empirically informed 
philosophy because it has some of the same motivation as experimental philosophy 
without making any strong claim to be a methodologically distinctive kind of 
philosophy. It, too, is motivated by antipathy to the armchair. It, too, contributes to a 
history of philosophy in which systematic, analytic, non-empirical work combines 
with systematic empirical work. It is true that the combination may not take the 
form of co-operation on a single research project. It may be a matter instead of 
philosophy appropriating results reported or arrived at for purposes internal to 
specialized, natural sciences such as neurophysiology or evolutionary biology. But 
the status of the finished result as philosophy seems never to be questioned: 
experimental philosophy is not in the same position.  
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This seems to be a crucial point. Either experimental philosophy is distinctive or it is 
not. It seems to proclaim and value distinctiveness. This distinctiveness seems to 
consist mainly4 in the application by philosophers of survey methods, including the 
construction of questionnaires, the identification and recruitment of research 
subjects, and the processing of results under constraints of achieving statistical 
significance. Either it uses these methods and is distinctive, in which case its status as 
philosophy is likely to be questioned, or it is less than distinctive and doesn’t deserve 
or sustain a manifesto. The illustrations already given of what I have called 
empirically informed philosophy belong to this less than distinctive sort of 
philosophy.  Though they leave the armchair, they do not have to be critical of 
conceptual analysis understood as necessary and sufficient conditions, and they do 
not have to be contemptuous of philosophers’ intuitions. The work of Alvin 
Goldman, for example, is empirically informed –broadly naturalistic even --and  
connected with the analytic project. Other illustrations of philosophy that leave the 
armchair without resorting to surveys can be drawn from normative moral 
philosophy (Sorell 2016). 
 
Returning now to history of philosophy, it is far more plausible to claim that there is 
a long tradition of empirically informed philosophy, including naturalistic philosophy,  
or cross-disciplinary empirical work with self consciously conceptualizing 
components, than that there is a long history of work culminating in philosophy that  
conducts its own experiments and surveys of differences between the intuitions of 
                                                        
4 See footnote 2. 
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philosophers and laypeople. In other words, it is possible to see experimental 
philosophy as part of a long tradition that starts in interdisciplinary or cross-
disciplinary research and continues in our own day, including a lot more philosophy 
than experimental philosophy. For example, it is plausible to say that there is a route 
from at least 17th century early modern philosophy to a broadly naturalist 
philosophy that includes Quine, Dennett and Ruse–all non-experimental 
philosophers influenced by scientific findings; it is more plausible to say this than to 
say there is a route that leads just to, or leads primarily to, Knobe, Nichols, Stich and 
Machery and their survey-based methodology.  
 
To defend this suggestion, we can begin by recalling Systma’s and Livengood’s 
suggestion that experimental philosophy departs from 20th and 21st century armchair 
philosophy in something like the way that Descartes’s Optics departs from 
Descartes’s Meditations. If all they mean is that once upon a time –in the first four 
decades of the 17th century in Western Europe– one and the same person –
Descartes– could do armchair philosophy and optics without being conscious of a 
change of subject, then, as we shall see, they are wrong about Descartes. More 
generally, it is far from clear that early modern philosophy is where to look for the 
pre-history of 21st century experimental philosophy. In this section and the next, I 
take the cases of Descartes5 and Hobbes,6 and argue that their philosophies do not 
look forward specifically to 21st century experimental philosophy with its 
                                                        
5 References are to the standard Adam and Tannery edition (Descartes 1964-1976) followed 
by volume and page number and The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Descartes 1985) followed 
by volume and page number. 
6 References are either by volume and page of the Molesworth edition of Hobbes’s English 
Works (Hobbes 1839-1843) followed by volume and page number or to specific modern editions of 
individual works.  
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methodological distinctiveness. At best, they look forward to empirically informed, 
including broadly naturalistic, philosophy. 
 
Why Descartes and Hobbes? Descartes is chosen because Systma and Livengood 
identify him as a precursor of the experimental philosophers of the 21st century. 
Hobbes is chosen because, like Descartes, he is a recognized figure in both the 
history of philosophy and science, albeit, in the case of science, a much less 
significant figure than Descartes. He is also an important proposer of explanatory 
mechanisms underlying agency, cognition and social behavior, which might qualify 
him to be a forerunner of experimental philosophy in the form Knobe embraces it.7 
There are also reasons for looking at Hobbes and Descartes together. They were 
contemporaries, interlocutors, and belonged to some of the same networks of 
philosopher/scientists. More substantially, they each promoted and illustrated a 
systematic alternative to Aristotelian natural philosophy. This means that their 
respective solutions to problems in optics are not just attempts to account 
empirically for the behavior of light in different media, but attempts to account for it 
in terms of the sizes, shapes and positions of the media and the motion generated by 
a light source – rather than Aristotelian forms and substances. Each of them worked 
on a philosophy of science that would count broadly mechanistic work in natural 
philosophy as science, and that would count Aristotelian appeals to forms, especially 
substantial forms, as non-science. 
                                                        
7 Hobbes is recommended on the leading X-Phi blog to an undergraduate wanting to take further his 
interest in moral universals and other X-Phi topics in metaethics: 
http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/2010/04/are-there-any-moral-
universals.html?cid=6a01901e204628970b019104332b70970c#comment-
6a01901e204628970b019104332b70970c 
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III 
 
Let us begin with the suggestion that Descartes combines the armchair and the 
experimental approaches that Systma and Livengood think can co-exist in 21st 
century philosophy. According to Systma and Livengood, metaphysics in Descartes is 
done from an armchair, but optics is not: optics depends on getting an eye of an ox 
and trying to investigate how it works. Both metaphysics and optics are philosophy, 
and, again according to Systma and Livengood, Descartes found it easy to move from 
one to the other without thinking he had to traverse a discipline boundary.  
 
Up to a point this account is correct. After all, the passage about the eye of the ox 
comes in the Optics, which is one of the Essays introduced by the Discourse on 
Method. Part Four of the Discourse runs through the main reflections of Descartes’s 
metaphysics. How could these reflections have appeared in the same book as 
Descartes’s optical hypotheses –the Discourse and Essays– if Descartes had not 
thought them closely connected? 
 
The answer is that he did think they were connected. He believed that optics 
depended upon metaphysics for some purposes, but also that his proposals in optics 
had their own simplicity and coherence, which a reader undistracted by theology but 
familiar with problems in optics would recognize.8 Descartes’s proposals in optics did 
                                                        
8 ‘Should anyone be shocked at first by some of the statements I make at the beginning of the 
Optics and the Meteorology because I call them “suppositions” and do not seem to care about 
proving them, let him have the patience to read the whole book attentively, and I trust that he will be 
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not have to be approached via metaphysics in order to be understood and accepted 
as solutions to optical problems. But the Optics was supposed to be an illustration of 
a self-consciously novel sort of philosophy, supposedly conducted according to the 
new “method” indicated in the Discourse on Method, and metaphysics was required 
to show that the human faculties required by the new sort of philosophy were 
reliable sources of truth. The “armchair” nature of this metaphysics –its being able to 
be conducted without reference to empirical results– was in fact crucial to its 
showing, without begging the question, that human faculties were up to the task of 
finding the formal and efficient causes of phenomena treated in optics in particular 
and physics in general.  
 
Metaphysics, however, plays a double role in Descartes’s philosophy. It is a sort of 
proof that human faculties and the conceptual apparatus employed in Cartesian 
physical explanation—the apparatus of extension and motion—are epistemically 
reliable to the highest degree. But it is also, by implication, a proof that explanation 
built on the contents of the senses is not reliable—and Aristotelian physical 
explanation depended wholly on content extracted from the senses. Descartes 
enlarges on the negative role of his metaphysics in a letter to Mersenne from 28 
January 1641. Referring to the full-scale presentation of his metaphysics in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
satisfied. For I take my reasonings to be so closely interconnected that just as the last are proved by 
the first, which are their causes, so the first are proved by the last, which are their effects. It must not 
be supposed that I am here committing the fallacy that the logicians call “arguing in a circle”. For as 
experience makes most of these effects quite certain, the causes from which I deduce them serve not 
so much to prove them as to explain them; indeed, quite to the contrary, it is the causes which are 
proved by the effects. And I have called them “suppositions” simply to make it known that I think I 
can deduce them from the primary truths I have expounded above; but I have deliberately avoided 
carrying out these deductions in order to prevent certain ingenious persons from taking the 
opportunity to construct, on what they believe to be my principles, some extravagant philosophy for 
which I shall be blamed.’(Descartes 1985, 150) (Descartes 1964-1976 Vol. 2, 76) 
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Meditations, he explains his selection of the titles of each of the six Meditations. The 
titles are devices for focusing attention on certain things—the ones that would 
please theologians—and distracting attention from others: 
These [topics given in the section titles] are the things that I want people 
mainly to notice. But I think I included many things besides; and I may tell 
you, between ourselves, that these six Meditations contain all the 
foundations for my physics. But please do not tell people, for that might 
make it harder for supporters of Aristotle to approve them. I hope that 
readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their truth, 
before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle. (Descartes 
1985, Vol. 3, 172-3) (Descartes 1964-1976 Vol. 3, 297-8) 
 
It is true that, for Descartes, metaphysics, optics, and astrophysics were all 
‘philosophy’, but this does not mean that ‘philosophy’ as a whole was a seamless, 
flat web of theory with no important differences of subject matter. Quite the 
opposite. In the 1647 Preface to The Principles of Philosophy, he compared 
philosophy to a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics and whose 
branches are the other sciences (Descartes 1964-1976 Vol.9B, 14). The tree 
metaphor conveys not only unity but stratification, and the stratification strains any 
comparison between, on the one hand, the armchair and non-armchair components 
of Cartesian philosophy and, on the other hand, the armchair and non-armchair 
components of current philosophy as conceived by Systma and Livengood. 
Metaphysics and physics do not co-exist in Descartes as Gettier’s armchair work on 
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the concept of knowledge (Gettier 1963) and Machery’s experimental work 
(Machery 2011) co-exist in current epistemology. 
 
When Descartes describes the tree of philosophy, he is describing a philosophy that 
for a long time he thought he could supply more or less single-handed (Descartes 
1985 Vol. 1, 188) (Descartes 1964-76 Vol. 9B, 17). The physics growing out of 
metaphysics was his physics, developed before the Discourse and Essays and 
suppressed because of its denial of the Aristotelian idea that the earth was the fixed 
centre of the universe. The medicine, mechanics and morals that were supported by 
physics were his medicine, mechanics and morals, with accretions of Harvey’s theory 
of the circulation of the blood. Medicine and morals were theories of the 
management of the union of mind and body, and therefore directly influenced by 
the substantial dualism propounded by the Meditations. The tree of philosophy, 
then, is (between the lines) the tree of Descartes’s philosophy. 
 
There is a difference here between Descartes and Hobbes. Hobbes also took 
philosophy to be a single system, and a system in which metaphysics or first 
philosophy precedes physics and morals. Unlike Descartes, however, he took it to be 
a system with elements contributed by several of the new philosophers: himself in 
optics and politics, Copernicus and Kepler in astrophysics, Galileo in terrestrial 
physics. (Hobbes [1650] 1839-1843 Vol. 1, vii-xii) His articulation of that system, in 
the three-volume Elements of Philosophy, was divided into a long book on body, a 
short book on man, and a third volume, again relatively short, on the citizen. De 
corpore states foundations for science in general and then articulates Hobbes’s 
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mechanics and physics. De homine contains optics and material on human passions 
and cognition. De cive contains a version of Hobbes’s politics. The three books did 
not appear in order. The last (De cive) came out first, in 1642; the first (De corpore) 
appeared second in 1650, and the middle volume (De homine) was published last, in 
1658. 
 
Does the system of The Elements of Philosophy contain armchair philosophy? Yes 
and No. If ‘armchair philosophy’ means ‘philosophy that can be done without 
empirical investigation’, then the largely definitional branch of ‘philosophy’ Hobbes 
calls ‘first philosophy’ may qualify as armchair philosophy (Hobbes [1651] 1839-1843 
Vol. 3, 671) (Hobbes [1656] 1839-1843 Vol. 7, 225-6). But if ‘armchair’ philosophy 
means ‘philosophy’ conducted solo –possibly in a stove heated room—the answer is 
‘No’. For according to Hobbes, definitional work is for teaching others –understood 
by Hobbes as presenting demonstrations of truths for an audience of people who 
want to learn– and the definitional work of first philosophy is for teaching the whole 
system of philosophy from the elements to others. The definitional part fixes the 
meanings of the relevant terms so that the audience of the subsequent 
demonstrations does not understand the relevant definienda differently from the 
demonstrator. First philosophy sets the stage for running through the constructions 
and demonstrations in geometry and mechanics. Then comes physics and 
psychology, ending up with morals and politics. As demonstrations to do with body 
are prior to demonstrations concerning man and citizen, according to Hobbes, the 
definitions of first philosophy are definitions of the most universal names: ‘body’, 
‘time’, ‘place’, ‘matter’, ‘motion’ and so on. Communicating these to others who 
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want to learn philosophy in general is the first step in the work of teaching 
philosophy from the elements. 
 
If armchair philosophy at its most authentic is philosophy done solo in one’s head 
away from external influences, then perhaps not even Descartes’ metaphysics is out 
and out armchair philosophy, since, as is well known, it consists not only of a series 
of reflections about dreams, demons and doubt which Descartes asks the reader to 
go through with him, but also Descartes’s replies to objections to Meditation One. 
The methodology of seeking questions and criticisms and absorbing them into one’s 
broadly philosophical reflections was followed in connection not only with the 
Meditations but with the Discourse and Essays. This method may be too social to 
count as armchair philosophy in the sense of Systma and Livengood. 
 
Hobbes, too, relied on networks of other philosophers. He not only read the works of 
other celebrity practitioners of the new philosophy; while on Grand Tours in the 
1630s, he met several scientists and observed experiments some of them performed 
(Malcolm 1996, 24). He was a member of circles of scientifically-minded aristocrats 
in England, and, when he lived in Paris in the 1640s, frequently attended meetings of 
an “academy”, as he calls it in Dialogus Physicus (Shapin and Schaffer 2011, 351), at 
the premises of the Minim friars. Here mathematicians, natural scientists and other 
savants could hear one another present findings and get responses (Shapin and 
Schaffer 2011, 29). 
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Unsurprisingly, then, there are respects in which the elements of Hobbes and 
Descartes that are nearest to the armchair are also empirically informed --in the 
sense of being informed by the first-person practice of science or having scientific 
results demonstrated to them. Hobbes worked backward from his reading of works 
by Euclid, Galileo, Copernicus and Harvey to inferring the fundamental concepts of 
the sciences: body, place, motion and so on. This is working back from highly 
empirical writings to the definienda of first philosophy, making the armchair 
philosophy that results empirically informed. Descartes’s armchair philosophy is 
comparable. It, too, works backward from physics –Descartes’s physics in the 
suppressed treatise, The World-- to an identification and vindication of its preferred 
conceptual apparatus. The fundamental concept in physics was extension –three 
dimensional spatial lay-out –understood alongside the laws of nature or motion. 
 
Because the philosophy closest to armchair philosophy in the writings of both 
philosophers described the materials for explanations for approved anti-Aristotelian 
sciences, and because the content of those sciences was not dreamt up a priori, but 
inferred from explananda recognized by both Aristotelian and “new” science, even 
armchair philosophy had sources outside the armchair.  
 
It is true that both Hobbes and Descartes are heavily invested in a broadly similar 
framework of explanation –roughly mechanistic explanation – that they 
independently argue is superior to the Aristotelian scholastic approach. Hobbes 
accuses Aristotle and the scholastics of clutching at the unintelligible in their so-
called explanations (Hobbes [1651] 1839-1843 Vol. 3, 664-88). Descartes complains 
 27 
of the complication of Aristotelian physics and its habit of explaining things ad hoc, 
comparing it unfavourably with the simplicity and uniformity of the corresponding 
Cartesian hypotheses.9 Granted that these claims are not based on conducting 
experiments, it is hard to see how claims about the relative economy or intelligibility 
of favoured explanations are unacceptably speculative. They reach the threshold for 
being empirically informed, even if not the 17th century experimental philosophy 
threshold for being appropriately empirically informed, i.e. through the personal 
compilation of natural histories and the conduct of experiments. 
 
 
IV 
At this point we encounter an important discontinuity between both Descartes and 
Hobbes on the one hand, and the modern experimental philosophers on the other. 
The point of disagreement is over do-it-yourself empirical investigation. Recall the 
relevant passage from Systma and Livengood already quoted: 
we will treat experimental philosophy as involving the systematic collection 
and analysis of empirical data to help answer philosophical questions or solve 
philosophical problems, whether or not the data directly concern intuitions. 
(Systma and Livengood 2016, …) 
Both Descartes and Hobbes think they can rely on already recorded observations and 
experiments conducted by others. Both rely on Harvey for observations and 
                                                        
9 ‘You must remember that in the whole history of Physics people have only tried to imagine 
some causes to explain the phenomena of nature, without hardly ever having succeeded. Compare 
my hypotheses with the hypotheses of others. Compare all their real qualities, their substantial forms, 
their elements and their other countless hypotheses with my single hypothesis that all bodies are 
composed of parts’ (Descartes 1964-76 Vol. 2, 196). 
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hypotheses about the circulation of the blood, for example. In Hobbes’s case, even 
theoretical explanations can be borrowed, at any rate from the likes of Copernicus, 
Kepler, Galileo and Harvey. Neither Descartes nor Hobbes, in other words, always or 
even characteristically adopts the do-it-yourself approach when it comes to the 
collection of data and the generation of phenomena through experiment.  
 
Perhaps this unsuits Descartes and Hobbes for the role of 17th century ancestors of 
21st century experimental philosophy. Perhaps the true ancestors are not early 
modern philosophical defenders of mechanistic explanation, such as Hobbes and 
Descartes, but philosophers from later in the 17th century who self-identified as 
“experimental philosophers” or philosophers like Hume who sometimes also 
described his approach as experimental. Systma and Livengood themselves mention 
the possible link with 17th century “experimental” philosophy (Systma and Livengood 
2016, 19), basing themselves on a paper by Anstey and Vanzo that directly addresses 
the question of the relation between the two experimental philosophies (Anstey and 
Vanzo 2016).10 
 
What is striking about 17th century experimental philosophy is that it illustrates the 
onset of a kind of reaction to the early philosophers of the scientific revolution, 
which consisted of lumping them together with the philosophers they reacted 
against. Hobbes and Descartes were decried as “speculative” philosophers alongside 
the scholastics they both criticized. What does ‘speculative’ mean? Does it mean 
                                                        
10 Anstey and Vanzo say only that contemporary experimental philosophers are’ historically 
distant relatives within the family of movements that give pride of place to observation and 
experiment’ 
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that Hobbes and Descartes arrived at sweeping hypotheses without acquainting 
themselves with any empirical data? Does it mean that they simply imposed the 
hypotheses on whatever data they did find? Not exactly. Hobbes and Descartes 
could be dismissed as speculative because they did not themselves go out and 
collect data for natural histories, but instead relied on common opinions and textual 
sources for their explananda. What is more, they did not favour hypotheses only 
because the data pointed that way. They could also be regarded as “speculative” 
because they committed themselves to a framework of explanation on account of its 
economy and simplicity and intelligibility in comparison with Aristotelian 
explanations of the same thing.  
 
Boyle’s experiments with the air pump, by contrast, were not simple exercises in 
making any old reported explananda yield to some hypothesis involving the local 
displacement of different kinds of matter. Anstey and Vanzo summarize the 
distinctive features of 17th century experimental philosophy in general and Boyle’s in 
particular: 
 
First, each experimenter built upon the work and discoveries of their 
predecessors. Second, instruments and the creation of phenomena that do 
not naturally occur in nature played a central role. Third, the experiments 
allowed Boyle (a) personally to experience (b) singular events, which 
happened at a specific time and place. The experience of these events was 
relied upon as (c) evidence for a general claim concerning the relation 
between pressure and volume of the air. This differs from traditional 
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natural philosophers’ references to experience, which were mostly (a´) based 
on common opinions, textual sources, or thought experiments about what 
happens (b´) not in specific circumstances, but always or for the most part, 
and which (c´) illustrated, rather than confirmed, general claims. (Anstey and 
Vanzo 2016, 7) 
 
The methodological importance for Boyle of personal experience of discrete results 
of empirical investigation does align him with experimental philosophy in the sense 
of Systma and Livengood. Boyle’s personal involvement in generating the airpump 
data corresponds to the do-it-yourself character of experimental philosophy as 
Systma and Livengood define it. But it also raises a question of the coherence of a 
research programme geared to natural histories as opposed to common opinions 
and textual sources. If personal observation of phenomena, including experimental 
results, is supposed to contribute to a written record of natural phenomena that 
others subsequently rely on, then the natural histories of the experimental 
philosophers contribute to second-hand explananda just as much as textbook 
results. They may be more specific, and more reliably described, second-hand 
explananda than those derived from textual sources with no explicit conception of 
the dependence of natural philosophy on natural history, but they are second-hand 
all the same. 11 In other words, the more natural history is compiled and relied on, 
                                                        
11 Admittedly, the most thoroughgoing experimental philosophers would have supported checking of 
facts from natural histories and replicating experiments. On the other hand, they allowed for reliance 
on testimony: Boyle, for instance, approves the reliance of experimental philosophers on the 
testimony of “Shepherds, Plowmen, Smiths, Fowlers, &c.,” who “are conversant with the Works of 
Nature” (Boyle 2000, 281–327 & 313), and the reliance of “the most rational physicians” on the 
testimony of their patients and earlier physicians (Boyle 2000, 308). I am grateful to Alberto Vanzo for 
these quotations. 
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the less conditions (a) and (b) of the passage above are satisfied, and the more first-
hand natural historiography feeds merely empirically-informed philosophy. 
Empirically-informed as opposed to experimental philosophy and natural history 
compilation in propria persona. 
 
A second problem with viewing Boyle as the precursor to experimental philosophers 
like Knobe, Nichols and Stich is that the problems of air pressure are not, and not 
similar to, any of the kinds of philosophical problem that Systma and Livengood 
associate with 21st century experimental philosophy. What, then, might the 
connecting link or links be? Anstey and Vanzo suggest two: 
First, current-day experimental philosophy emerged as an 
attempt to replace assumptions about the content of people’s linguistic 
intuitions with the results of empirical inquiries on the content of those 
intuitions. Similarly, early modern experimental philosophy emerged as an 
attempt to replace natural philosophical systems derived from untested 
general principles with systems built on substantial observational and 
experimental foundations. 
Second, old and new experimental philosophers share similar attitudes 
toward speculative, apriori reflections. Some current-day experimental 
philosophers seek to identify reliable, universally shared intuitions which 
provide “a proper evidential foundation” for philosophical analysis, 
traditionally conceived (Alexander and Weinberg 2007, 61). Similarly, several 
early modern experimental philosophers, especially among the proponents of 
the two-stage method of Baconian natural philosophy, thought that empirical 
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research would establish the principles for a strictly demonstrative natural 
philosophy. (Anstey and Vanzo 2016, 18) 
 
These suggestions, while reasonable as far as they go, are unhelpful in relation to the 
broad definition of experimental philosophy given by Systma and Livengood. Either 
experimental philosophy is a matter of testing claims about intuitions elicited by 
philosophical cases in conceptual analysis, in which case its claims of standing in a 
tradition of philosophy as the broad empirical study of mind and morals and many 
other things is compromised; or else experimental philosophy is more broadly 
defined, e.g. as Systma and Livengood want to define it, in which case it has to be 
seen as the descendant of empirically informed philosophy, which also leads up to 
naturalized but non-experimental philosophy. On this approach, Knobe and Nichols 
do not have a history distinct from Dennett and Quine, and all together owe 
something to early moderns before Boyle. 
  
The second of the Anstey-Vanzo suggestions for continuity between old and new 
experimental philosophy works better, for it finds a common ambition for the old 
and new varieties –finding an evidence base for results reached by analysis on the 
one hand and demonstration on the other. The problem is that this is a common 
ambition of only the kinds of experimental philosophy that seek to preserve the 
results of philosophical analysis. Some prominent experimental philosophers –
notably Knobe--are hostile to analysis in particular and linguistic philosophy in 
general. To accommodate these as well as the Weinbergs of experimental 
philosophy –the ones who are sympathetic to analysis (see Weinberg et al 2001)– a 
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lower common denominator needs to be found, and a lower common denominator 
threatens to undermine the suggestion of a common ambition. Systma and 
Livengood do try to identify a lower common denominator. Call this their 
ecumenism. The problem is that a very inclusive definition of experimental 
philosophy resulting from their ecumenism either makes urgent the question ‘But is 
it philosophy?’ or else it answers that question in the affirmative and experimental 
philosophy ceases to be different in principle from empirically informed or broadly 
naturalistic philosophy.  
 
This is important, because of the much looser continuity between past philosophy 
and current experimental philosophy that the wider definition seems to allow. 
Instead of a continuity consisting of philosophers each conducting experiments or 
carrying out empirical investigations for themselves, one can discern a continuity of 
interest in making philosophy reflect the results of systematic scientific enquiry. This 
interest arguably has a much longer history than the period from 1600 or1650 and 
2000. But the fact that it does fails to settle the question of whether everything that 
these days is called ‘experimental philosophy’ is what specialists in the field working 
today would call ‘philosophy’. Which takes us back to the question posed at the 
beginning.12 
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